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CONGRESS AS CULPRIT:
HOW LAWMAKERS SPURRED ON THE
COURT’S ANTI-CONGRESS CRUSADE
NEAL DEVINS†
INTRODUCTION
Poor Congress. Twenty-seven of its laws have been struck down
in just over six years.1 According to the New York Times, Congress is
now “The High Court’s Target.”2 And to law professors, the Court is
increasingly “obliterating a role for Congress as a separate institu-
tion”3—so much so that examining the “Causes of the Recent Turn in
Constitutional Interpretation” and sorting out whether it is time to
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7, 2000. Thanks to Chris Schroeder for inviting me to the conference, to Michael Dry and Adina
Dziuk for helping me research this Essay, and to Lou Fisher, Bob Nagel, Suzanna Sherry, Bill
Treanor, and Keith Whittington for helpful comments.
1. From April 1995 to June 2000, the Court declared unconstitutional twenty-three fed-
eral statutes. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT’L J. 1810, 1811 (2000). In its 2001
Term, the Court invalidated all or part of four federal statutes. Linda Greenhouse, In the Year
of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A12.
2. Linda Greenhouse, The High Court’s Target: Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, § 4,
at 3.
3. Id. (quoting Robert Post, Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley School of Law); see also Christopher Bryant & Timothy J.
Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 332–354, 369–388 (2001) (noting the Su-
preme Court’s increased scrutiny of legislative records in its recent rulings on the constitution-
ality of federal statutes, and concluding, ultimately, that this approach is an unwarranted intru-
sion into the congressional sphere); Larry Kramer, The Arrogance of the Court, WASH. POST,
May 23, 2000, at A29 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court’s overturning of the Violence Against
Women Act is indicative of the Supreme Court’s recent tendency to interfere with the legisla-
tive process).
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bring the “Constitution in Exile” in from the cold seem anything but
academic exercises.4
Notwithstanding this hue and cry, Congress seems a bit oblivious
to its fate. Although the Democratically controlled Senate Judiciary
Committee may soon take recent Supreme Court decisionmaking into
account when confirming President George W. Bush’s judicial nomi-
nees, Congress has yet to strike back at the Court in any meaningful
way. Indeed, rather than condemn the Court and launch a counter-
offensive, Congress has paid little notice to the Court’s decisionmak-
ing. If anything, as I will argue in this Essay, Congress had been (and
still may be) spurring the Court into action by signaling its indiffer-
ence to the constitutional fate of its handiwork. First, Congress,
through word and deed, increasingly treats the Court as if it is the ul-
timate interpreter of the Constitution. Second, unless responding to a
Supreme Court decision invalidating federal legislation, Congress has
shown little interest in taking Court rulings into account when craft-
ing constitutionally problematic laws. Third, by slowing down the
confirmation process, by failing to increase the salaries of federal
judges, and by disregarding calls to limit federal court litigation to
matters that are truly national, Congress has made the job of being a
federal judge less desirable.
For all these reasons, the Court has had little incentive to ac-
commodate Congress and, if anything, it may see the invalidation of
some federal statutes as a way both to assert its own power and to pay
Congress back for its insensitive management of the courts. Further-
more, there has been little reason for the Justices to fear reprisal.
Congress’s rhetoric emphasizes the supremacy of the Court’s inter-
pretation of the Constitution. Moreover, the Justices’ invalidation of
federal statutes has left intact analogous state programs and, for the
most part, allowed Congress to revisit issues by recrafting the invali-
dated statutes.
In calling attention to how Congress’s attitudes toward both the
Court and the Constitution may have factored into the Court’s deci-
sionmaking, I see my project as complementing Christopher Schroe-
der’s examination of recent decisions invalidating federal statutes.5
4. I refer here, of course, to this conference, especially Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes
of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307 (2001). See also William W.
Van Alstyne, Foreword: The Constitution in Exile: Is It Time to Bring It in from the Cold?, 51
DUKE L.J. 1 (2001).
5. See generally Schroeder, supra note 4 (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism
opinions are motivated by a distrust of the federal government).
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Specifically, just as the social norm of distrust in the federal govern-
ment affects the Court’s understanding of the deference it owes Con-
gress,6 the Court is likewise affected by its “inside the Washington,
D.C., beltway” impressions of Congress.
Before turning to my examination of Congress’s role in precipi-
tating the current constitutional moment,7 I think it useful to take
note of how the 1930s Congress—through sloppy legislative draft-
ing—prompted some of the Court’s anti–New Deal activism. In other
words, to the extent that today’s Congress is fueling a return to the
“exiled” pre–New Deal Constitution, the past is certainly prologue.
I.  LESSONS FROM THE 1937 CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
Congress played an instrumental role both in prompting the
Court to repudiate several early New Deal statutes and in facilitating
the Court’s subsequent embrace of the New Deal.8 Consider, for ex-
ample, two statutes invalidated by the Court—the Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 19349 and the Frazier–Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act of
1934.10 Congress, when enacting the Retirement Act, “whipped the
legislation through,” with the House “consider[ing] it for only forty
6. Id. at 351–59.
7. See infra notes 25–116 and accompanying text (assessing Congress’s responsibility for
the Supreme Court’s willingness to overturn legislation); see also Schroeder, supra note 4, at
315–22 (summarizing Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments).
8. I make this point in Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 237, 250–61 (1996). For a more comprehensive (but somewhat different) treatment of
this subject, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 9–47 (1998) [hereinafter CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT] (approaching changes in the constitutional jurisprudence of the New Deal era as
part of a continuous historical thread); Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Consultation, 1998 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 80 [hereinafter Cushman, The Hughes Court] (arguing
that the Hughes Court played a distinctly consultative role during the economic and political
crises of the 1930s, supplying Congress with frequent constitutional counsel). Unlike Cushman, I
think there is a real divide between pre- and post-1937 decisionmaking. After all, the New Deal
Court, from 1937 to 1947, overturned thirty-two pre-1937 decisions. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT,
THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937–1947, at 300–01
(1948); see also Schroeder, supra note 4, at 330 (reasoning that post-1937 decisions were not
compelled by prior decisions). For further discussion, see infra note 91 and accompanying text
(discussing the significance of the fact that the Rehnquist Court, while striking down numerous
federal statutes, rarely calls earlier precedent into question).
9. Railroad Retirement Act, Pub. L. No. 73-485, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934), invalidated in R.R.
Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935).
10. Amendment of June 28, 1934 to § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544, invalidated in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935).
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minutes before registering its approval.”11 Because Congress failed,
among other things, to build a record to support the measure’s impact
on interstate commerce, Justices sympathetic to the statutory scheme
complained that the government did not present its case in a con-
vincing way.12
The Debt Relief Act likewise “inspired a storm of controversy
[over] its validity.”13 Criticized as “one of the worst recent examples
of draftsmanship in federal legislation,” the bill was “hastily drafted
and hurriedly passed” by a “harried Congress.”14 When signing the
measure, Franklin Delano Roosevelt spoke of the bill as “loosely
worded . . . [and] requir[ing] amendment at the next session of Con-
gress.”15 These words proved prophetic, for, immediately after the act
was invalidated in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,16
Louis Brandeis, the opinion’s author, lamented that “[t]he President
has been living in a fool’s paradise . . . . I should not be surprised if
everything would have to be redrafted.”17
The Railroad Retirement and Debt Relief Acts typify early New
Deal legislation—not well-drawn and tying “sweeping assertions of
federal power to slap-dash justifications.”18 Senate Judiciary Chair-
man Henry Ashurst described the period this way: “We ground out
laws so fast . . . . [we] reasoned from non-existent premises and, at
times, we seemed to accept chimeras, phantasies and exploded social
and economic theories as our authentic guides.”19 Along the same
lines, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone spoke of “[t]he general sloppiness of
everything that has been done in connection with this effort” and his
11. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTION-
AL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 32 (1995).
12. For example, Benjamin Cardozo suggested that the Justice Department, by analogizing
the statute “to a workman’s compensation act,” could have compensated for gaps left open by
Congress. Id. at 41 (discussing a memorandum drafted by Justice Cardozo).
13. F. Carlisle Roberts, The New Frazier-Lemke Act—Its Provisions, Its Constitutionality,
22 A.B.A. J. 15, 15 (1936). For additional sources, see Cushman, The Hughes Court, supra note
8, at 97 n.6.
14. Cushman, The Hughes Court, supra note 8, at 81 (quoting various sources).
15. Roosevelt Signs Farm, Rail Bills, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1934, at 21.
16. 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935).
17. Cushman, The Hughes Court, supra note 8, at 81 (quoting Richard D. Friedman, Char-
les Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 1930–1941: The Complexities of Moderation 231 (1978) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University)).
18. Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Courtpacking Episode
of 1937, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 267, 289 (1988).
19. HENRY F. ASHURST, A MANY COLORED TOGA: THE DIARY OF HENRY FOUNTAIN
ASHURST 333 (1962).
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“hope that Congress will now undertake to do its job.”20 Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes complained that “the laws have been poorly
drafted, the briefs have been badly drawn and the arguments have
been poorly presented.”21
Failings of Congress, of course, tell only part of the story. After
all, had the Court wanted to uphold these programs, the legal land-
mines that the Justices deployed to limit federal power never would
have been devised in the first place. At the same time, the Court’s
willingness, starting in 1937, to sign on to the New Deal is partially at-
tributable to Congress’s decision to take the Court’s rulings into ac-
count when crafting legislation. Unlike the “loose draftsmanship and
emotional advocacy” of the First New Deal, observed Arthur
Schlessinger, the laws of this “Second New Deal were masterpieces of
the lawyer’s art.”22
The lesson here is simple: Congress cannot turn its back on the
Court and expect to get away with it. Indeed, public acceptance of ju-
dicial independence and supremacy ultimately proved damaging both
to Roosevelt and his proposal to pack the Court with Justices “who
will bring to the Courts a present-day sense of the Constitution.”23
And while the Justices came to realize that the Court could not resist
“the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country,”24
20. ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 395 (1956) (quoting
a letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to John Basset Moore dated May 30, 1935). Following the
Court’s invalidation of the Roosevelt administration’s 1933 “hot oil” program, Justice Owen
Roberts sounded a similar message, informing Interior Secretary Harold Ickes that he was “en-
tirely sympathetic with what [the administration was] trying to do in the oil matter and that he
hoped we would pass a statute that would enable [the administration constitutionally to] carry
out [its] policy.” 1 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FIRST
THOUSAND DAYS, 1933–36, at 273 (1953) (diary entry of Jan. 11, 1935).
21. BURTON K. WHEELER WITH PAUL F. HEALY, YANKEE FROM THE WEST 329 (1962).
On the issue of how poor Justice Department lawyering contributed to the Court’s invalidation
of early New Deal legislation, see Devins, supra note 8, at 251–53. See also Seth P. Waxman,
Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2001) (contrasting
the early New Deal period to today and, in so doing, arguing that Rehnquist Court efforts to
limit congressional power are impervious to high quality government lawyering).
22. ARTHUR M. SCHLESSINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF
UPHEAVAL 395 (1960).
23. 6 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 127 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941). For analysis, see RICHARD POLENBERG,
REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT’S GOVERNMENT 148–94 (1966) (detailing the fallout from Roose-
velt’s failed Court-packing plan); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Diffi-
culty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1022–28 (2000) (highlighting public
support for the Court during the Court-packing episode).
24. OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951); see also CHARLES
E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1928) (noting that, when the
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the Court, by calling attention to the poor quality of Congress’s work,
was able to cast Congress as a coconspirator in the demise of much
early New Deal legislation.
What is striking here, as the next section of this Essay will detail,
is how today’s constitutional counterrevolution parallels the revolu-
tion of 1937. By giving short shrift both to Supreme Court decisions
and to its own role as coequal interpreter of the Constitution, Con-
gress has helped pave the way for the Rehnquist Court to reinvigor-
ate the “Constitution in Exile.”
II.  CONGRESS AND THE RETURN OF THE “CONSTITUTION IN EXILE”
At the end of the Court’s 2000 Term, Justice Antonin Scalia took
aim at Congress. Complaining that “‘Congress is increasingly abdi-
cating its independent responsibility to be sure that it is being faithful
to the Constitution,’”25 Scalia minced no words in placing the blame
for Court invalidations of federal statutes at Congress’s door. Fur-
thermore, Scalia made clear that the pace of Court rulings invalidat-
ing federal statutes is likely to quicken. “[I]f Congress is going to take
the attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the
Supreme Court worry about the Constitution,” warned Scalia, “then
perhaps th[e] presumption [of Congress acting constitutionally] is
unwarranted.”26
Scalia’s comments, of course, are self-serving. In pointing to
Congress’s misdeeds, Scalia (never hinting that the Court is sharply
divided) suggested that the Justices have little choice but to strike
down the abominations that Congress is throwing its way.27 More to
Court departs from “its fortress in public opinion,” it may well suffer from self-inflicted
wounds).
25. Taylor, supra note 1, at 1811.
26. Id.
27. Here, I think, is where I part company with Professor Schroeder. While it is certainly
true that increasingly negative attitudes toward the federal government help create the occasion
for the Justices to engage in “motivated reasoning” and strike down federal legislation, I think
Schroeder pays insufficient attention to the fact that the Court often divides five to four in these
cases. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating part of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act in a 5-4 decision); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551
(1996) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act in a 5-4 decision); see also Schroeder, supra
note 4, at 310 (mentioning that the central decisions of the post-Lopez Court are identical 5-4
votes). Specifically, if negative attitudes toward government explain the recent shift in Court
decisionmaking, why are four Justices (including the two newest members of the Court) insensi-
tive to this phenomenon? Indeed, had Al Gore become president, there is every reason to think
that a Gore appointee would have discounted this growing distrust of Congress and, in so doing,
shifted the balance on the Court to those favoring pro-Congress rulings. By way of contrast, as I
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the point, Scalia and other Justices willing to curtail Congress’s pow-
ers are ideologically predisposed to limit lawmakers’ prerogatives
and, in so doing, to hear cases where they can point the finger at Con-
gress for overstepping its enumerated powers.28 Nevertheless, there is
reason to think that there are several kernels of truth in Scalia’s re-
buke. Congress does seem disinterested both in defending its turf as
coequal interpreter of the Constitution and in thinking through the
consequences of Supreme Court decisions. As a result, legislative
drafting—as was true during the early New Deal—appears to be, at
best, sloppy and, at worst, a direct invitation to the Court to strike
down Congress’s enactments.
In making this point, this section offers some anecdotal evidence
about Congress-Court relations. My aim is not so much to offer de-
finitive proof; instead, it is to detail why—based on my observations
over the past several years—I have come to think that Congress has
played a significant role in the ongoing imbroglio over the scope of its
powers.
A. Congress and Constitutional Interpretation
Congress is increasingly abdicating its core powers, including its
power to interpret the Constitution independently.29 Sometimes,
will detail in this Essay, the pace of legislative disinterest in the Court and the Constitution has
played an instrumental role, but only in changing the attitudes of Supreme Court Justices al-
ready predisposed to disapprove of congressional intrusions into state functions. Here, Con-
gress’s apparent disinterest in the Court and the Constitution is emboldening; it makes these
Justices feel increasingly certain that now is the time to slap Congress down (especially because
of the growing distrust of Congress).
28. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997) (criticizing Congress for failing to
hold legislative hearings or consider less restrictive alternatives); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (invoking Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803), and con-
demning Congress for seeking to statutorily overturn a Court interpretation of the Constitu-
tion); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (emphasizing Congress’s failure to hold hearings or make findings
concerning the impact of gun possession on interstate commerce).
29. On the question of congressional abdication of power, see generally LOUIS FISHER,
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR & SPENDING (2000) [hereinafter FISHER, CON-
GRESSIONAL ABDICATION] (assessing the implications of the shifting balance of power in the
federal government as Congress abdicated its role in the areas of war and spending powers);
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3–21 (1993) (suggesting that congressional delegation of
power, beginning in the 1930s, short-circuits the democratic election process). On the question
of Congress’s role in interpreting the Constitution, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 233–47 (1998) [hereinafter FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES] (arguing that the judiciary should not be the sole interpreter of
the Constitution, but, rather, that the three branches must coordinate efforts to fuse law and
politics in fostering a constitutional dialogue, from which a more comprehensive interpretation
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Congress treats the Constitution as the exclusive province of the Su-
preme Court; on other occasions, Congress simply seems indifferent
to the constitutionality of its enactments, including whether the Su-
preme Court is likely to approve or disapprove of its decisionmaking.
In so doing, Congress signals the Court that it has little institutional
stake in constitutional matters and, accordingly, that there is little, if
any, institutional price the Court will pay when invalidating federal
legislation. With little reason to think about how its decisions will play
on Capitol Hill,30 the Rehnquist Court’s willingness to strike down
federal legislation of which it disapproves is anything but surprising.
One manifestation of this phenomenon is the growing use of
“expedited Supreme Court review” provisions in cases for which
Congress finds its handiwork constitutionally suspect. Specifically,
rather than sorting out the constitutionality of the legislation it is con-
sidering, Congress sometimes enacts a fast-track provision enabling
litigants both to bypass the federal courts of appeal and to secure
automatic Supreme Court review.31 Over the past several years, Con-
gress has included expedited review provisions on several high-profile
enactments, including flag burning legislation,32 the Gramm-Rudman
Act,33 the Communications Decency Act,34 the Line Item Veto Act,35
will emerge); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194
(1999) (arguing for a method of constitutional interpretation that takes into account the populist
views of the general public).
30. See Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 529 (1998) (reasoning
that the Justices rarely consider the possibility of a legislative override); Jeffrey A. Segal, Sepa-
ration-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
28, 31–32 (1997) (arguing that the high cost of congressional reversal and the many vetoes pre-
cluding such a reversal account for the Court’s lack of concern for possible legislative over-
rides).
31. The precise terms of these expedited review provisions vary greatly, but most mandate
Supreme Court review. See, e.g., Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1200,
1211 (1996), invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (mandating Su-
preme Court review after trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia).
Moreover, while the federal courts of appeal are almost always bypassed, it is sometimes the
case that a three-judge district court panel will hear the initial challenge. Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(a)(5), 99 Stat. 1038, 1098.
32. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 3, 103 Stat. 777, 777, invalidated in
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1998).
33. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
§ 274(a)(5), 99 Stat. 1038, 1098.
34. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 561, 110 Stat. 133, 142–
43, partially invalidated in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
35. Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1200, 1211 (1996), invalidated in Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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and census reform legislation.36 In all these statutes, the expedited re-
view provision was not part of the original bill; instead, after constitu-
tional objections were raised, Congress—rather than settle the issue
itself—decided that it was best to hand the matter off to the Supreme
Court.37
The Line Item Veto Act exemplifies how expedited review pro-
visions, in effect, delegate Congress’s power to interpret the Constitu-
tion to the Supreme Court.38 Although Senator Robert Byrd spoke of
the oath that each member takes to “support and defend the Consti-
tution,” and, with it, Congress’s responsibility to “be resolving those
[constitutional] questions on [its] own,”39 nearly all members were
quite happy to leave the Act’s constitutional fate solely in the hands
of the Supreme Court. For example, Representative William Clinger,
chairman of the House committee with jurisdiction over the bill, an-
swered objections “that [the bill] is unconstitutional” by declaring: “It
is not really our job to determine what is constitutional or what is not
unconstitutional.”40 Equally striking, Senator Paul Simon, a cosponsor
of the bill, explained the provision requiring expedited Supreme
Court review this way: “What we do not want is to live in limbo . . . .
36. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 209, 111 Stat. 2240, 2482 (1997).
37. Consider, for example, census legislation enacted in 1997, supra note 36. Democrats
and Republicans divided over the constitutionality of using statistical sampling to compensate
for the historical undercounting of minorities. Compare 143 CONG. REC. H8222 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hastert (R-IL)) (arguing that statistical sampling is unconstitu-
tional), with id. at H8228 (statement of Rep. Watt (D-NC)) (arguing that statistical sampling is
constitutional). To break this logjam, lawmakers included an expedited review provision “if the
Census Bureau attempts to spend money on sampling in the 2000 Census.” Jerry Gray, In
Spending Bill, A Gauntlet on Census is Thrown Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at A23.
38. Before enacting the Line Item Veto Act, Congress held numerous hearings (over a
number of years) concerning the constitutionality of a line-item veto. See FISHER,
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION, supra note 29, at 137–53 (detailing the legislative history of the
Line Item Veto Act). On other occasions, however, Congress has added an expedited review
provision to a measure without considering the pertinent constitutional issues in a meaningful
way. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the expedited review procedures in
the Gramm-Rudman Act).
39. 142 CONG. REC. 6509 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd (D-WV)).
40. Id. at 6912 (statement of Rep. Clinger (R-PA)). Indeed, to facilitate fast-track judicial
review, Congress added a provision to the bill allowing lawmakers to challenge the statute even
before President Clinton employed the line-item veto. In Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997),
however, the Supreme Court concluded that lawmakers lacked standing to bring the case. Id. at
830.
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[As to the legislation’s constitutionality,] I do not know who is right.
The courts have to make that determination.”41
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item
Veto Act.42 The Justices almost always invalidate congressional stat-
utes that contain expedited review provisions.43 And why not? Con-
gress cannot possibly object to such Court decisions, for the expedited
review provision makes clear that Congress sees itself as subordinate
to the Court and, consequently, has little stake in the constitutional
fate of its handiwork.44
There are other ways that Congress signals the Court that consti-
tutional questions are the Court’s domain. When deliberating about
the Constitution’s meaning, Congress often treats the Court’s deci-
sions as definitive and final. In other words, unlike Court-curbing pe-
riods (during which Congress has sought to limit the reach of Court
decisions on, among other things, abortion, busing, and school
41. 141 CONG. REC. 8417 (1995) (statement of Sen. Simon (D-IL)). When Congress en-
acted an expedited review provision in the Gramm-Rudman Act, similar concerns were ex-
pressed. House Judiciary Chair Pete Rodino noted that “the constitutional problems with this
measure” have not been resolved and “[t]hat is why the inclusion of a provision . . . calling for
quick judicial review is absolutely essential.” 131 CONG. REC. 30,158 (1985) (statement of Rep.
Rodino (D-NJ)). Along the same lines, Representative Jack Brooks remarked: “There is hardly
anybody who can say with a straight face that Gramm-Rudman or any version of it is free of
serious constitutional questions. It is vital that we have a mechanism in place to ensure that
those questions get to court and be addressed directly.” Id. at 30,150 (statement of Rep. Brooks
(D-TX)); see also infra note 62 (discussing the expedited review provision in the Communica-
tions Decency Act).
42. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998). I do not mean to suggest, how-
ever, that the Court’s decision was a good one. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and
the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1188–93 (2001) (de-
fending the constitutionality of line-item veto legislation).
43. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (invalidating portions of the Com-
munications Decency Act); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (invalidating flag
protection legislation); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding that section 251 of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act violates the Constitution by permit-
ting Congress to participate in the execution of its own laws). And when the Justices have not
declared statutes unconstitutional, they still have been able to frustrate congressional objectives
through statutory interpretation. See Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House of Representa-
tives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999) (rejecting the planned use of statistical sampling during the 2000
census as inconsistent with the Census Act).
44. For a related argument, see Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 37–68 (1993) (arguing that lawmakers
occasionally leave it to the courts to address contentious political issues the lawmakers could not
adequately resolve).
DEVINS.DOC 12/03/01 9:29 AM
2001] CONGRESS AS CULPRIT 445
prayer),45 the modern Congress hardly ever casts doubt on either the
correctness of the Court’s rulings or, more fundamentally, the Court’s
power to interpret the Constitution authoritatively.46
Consider, for example, Congress’s response to Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,47 a 1995 Supreme Court decision declaring that
federal affirmative action programs must satisfy the Court’s strictest
standard of judicial review.48 In the immediate wake of the Court’s
decision, Senator Phil Gramm proposed eliminating set-asides for
minorities and women in federal contracting. Gramm explained, “my
amendment is written in total conformity with Adarand. . . . That is, if
the court finds that a contractor was [personally] subject to discrimi-
nation, the court may provide a remedy with a set-aside . . . .”49 In
sharp contrast, Senator Arlen Specter called attention to Adarand’s
recognition that the government may act in response to “both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination.”50 Along
these lines, Senator Patty Murray countered Gramm’s efforts by pro-
posing that federal funds can be used only for “programs . . . com-
pletely consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in . . .
Adarand.”51 In the end, the Murray amendment was approved by a
45. See EDWARD KEYNES WITH RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS:
PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION (1989) (providing a general treatment of Congress’s power
to curb the Court in certain areas).
46. For a historical overview of Court-curbing, see FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES, supra note 29, at 200–30. In arguing that today’s Congress is accepting of the
Court’s “ultimate authority,” I do not mean to suggest that members of Congress never express
disappointment with the Court or, alternatively, that Congress never acts in response to Court
decisions. My point, instead, is that Congress—notwithstanding the Court’s increasing willing-
ness to strike down federal legislation—is far more accepting of the Court today than it has been
in the past. See infra notes 47–58 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s response to the
recent wave of anti-Congress Rehnquist Court decisions).
47. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
48. Id. at 237–38. While the Court remanded the case to the lower courts (and thereby did
not rule on the constitutionality of a highway set-aside program), Adarand is the first case in
which the Court refused to uphold a congressionally approved affirmative action plan. On the
question of whether federal affirmative action legislation is poorly crafted, see Devins, supra
note 42, at 1200–06 (highlighting Congress’s disinterest in building a factual record supporting
affirmative action legislation).
49. 141 CONG. REC. 19,670 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm (R-TX)).
50. Id. at 19,671 (statement of Sen. Specter (R-PA)) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s opinion
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
51. Id. at 19,667 (statement of Sen. Murray (D-WA)).
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lopsided 84-13 vote, and the Gramm amendment was soundly de-
feated by a bipartisan 61-36 vote.52
Two things stand out from this nonresponse to Adarand. First,
everyone agreed that Adarand was the law of the land. Gramm did
not build his case around the wrongness, as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, of the government’s decision to sometimes take race
into account;53 Murray did not argue that Adarand was wrong in em-
bracing strict review and, consequently, that Congress should defend
existing affirmative action programs (and leave it for the Court, not
Congress, to implement the Justices’ understanding of things). Sec-
ond, in sorting out what to do, the Senate thought it better to return
this issue to the courts than to interpret Adarand independently. In
particular, the Gramm amendment required the Senate to embrace a
particular understanding of Adarand. The Murray amendment, in
contrast, was so open-ended that it would not require Congress inde-
pendently to adopt a particular understanding of Adarand. As a con-
sequence, litigants challenging the program could seek a definitive
answer as to what Adarand means by going to a higher authority than
Congress, namely, the federal courts.
It is little wonder that Supreme Court Justices feel empowered
by such legislative deliberations. By seeing the Constitution as the
Supreme Court’s domain, Congress encourages the Court to strike
down measures the Justices dislike, to settle presidential elections,
and so forth.54 And while the Justices may not know about the
52. Kevin Merida, Senate Rejects Gramm Bid to Bar Affirmative Action Set-Asides, WASH.
POST, July 21, 1995, at A13. More recently, in September 1997, then-Senator John Ashcroft
sponsored hearings intended to demonstrate that federally funded set-asides were inconsistent
with Adarand. Robert G. Kaiser & Walter Pincus, Chief Foe as Chief Defender?: Ashcroft Criti-
cal of Laws, Decisions He Would Enforce, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2001, at A1. But, as it did with
the Gramm proposal, the Senate left the matter alone, preferring to steer clear of the affirma-
tive action wars rather than engage in a partisan fight over the propriety of preferences.
53. Gramm did argue, however, that affirmative action was bad public policy. See 141
CONG. REC. 19,670 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm (R-TX)) (arguing that “inequity” cannot
be corrected by “making inequity the law of the land”).
54. By deciding Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), the Supreme Court signaled that it, not
Congress, was best positioned to settle the presidential election. Whether or not the Court
doubted “the capacity of Congress to carry the burden of political leadership in conditions of
constitutional stress,” Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
679, 688–89 (2001), there is little question that the Court thought it could decide the issue with-
out destroying its institutional legitimacy. In this way, Bush v. Gore is very much like the Wa-
tergate tapes case, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In believing that “they could as-
sure the legitimacy of the process and the legitimacy of the winner of the presidency,” the
members of the Court reached out to decide a fundamental question that, in critical respects,
the Constitution delegated to the Congress. Gerald Gunther, A Risky Moment for the Court,
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Gramm-Murray exchange, they certainly know that a legislative
backlash has not followed in the wake of recent rulings limiting con-
gressional power. There is no talk of packing the Court, of stripping it
of jurisdiction,55 or of amending the Constitution in response to these
rulings. Moreover, these decisions played no role in the 2000 elec-
tions.56 Finally, Congress has shown relatively little interest in rewrit-
ing these statutes.57 And when Congress has revisited its handiwork,
lawmakers have paid close attention to the Supreme Court’s rulings,
limiting their efforts to revisions the Court is likely to approve.58
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A37; see also Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative
Autonomy, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30, 33 (1974) (criticizing the Court for thinking that it has a “spe-
cial obligation to save the nation in episodes of constitutional crisis”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Re-
count Is In, and the Supreme Court Loses, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2001, at A23 (“The dispute over
the recount was political, not legal, and should have been resolved by Congress rather than by
the courts.”).
55. See infra notes 103–10 and accompanying text (describing how Congress is actually in-
creasing the workload of the federal judiciary, much to the Court’s dismay).
56. For an explanation, published before the election, as to why this is so, see Taylor, supra
note 1, at 1818–19 (examining why voters “have far more confidence in the Supreme Court than
in Congress . . . [and] the executive branch”).
57. In sharp contrast, following the Court’s invalidation of early New Deal legislation, the
New Deal Congress reworked several statutes. Cushman, The Hughes Court, supra note 8, at
81–97.
58. Of the twenty-three statutes struck down by the Court between 1995 and 2000, Con-
gress revised four of them. First, in 1996, Congress responded to United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), a Supreme Court decision invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.
Id. at 567. Under the new statute, the federal government must prove that the firearm has
“moved in or otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)
(Supp. V 1999); see Guns in Schools: A Federal Role?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Youth
Violence of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9 (1995) (statement of Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) (explaining how the statute conforms to
Lopez). Second, in 1998, following the Court’s repudiation of portions of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997), Congress enacted the Chil-
dren’s Online Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (Supp. V 1999). “[A]ddress[ing] the spe-
cific concerns raised by the Supreme Court,” the Act responds to several of the Court’s criti-
cisms of the CDA, including the lack of legislative hearings, the failure to consider less
restrictive alternatives, and the overbroad definition of what constitutes indecency. H.R. REP.
NO. 105–775, at 12 (1998). Third, in 2000, Congress responded to City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997), a Supreme Court decision invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) as an improper exercise of Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 536. The new statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (Supp. V 1999), narrows the scope of RFRA protec-
tions to categories Congress thinks satisfy the Boerne standard or make use of its spending and
commerce powers. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774–75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (remarks of Sen.
Hatch (R-UT)) (detailing sources of constitutional authority for the statute and, in so doing,
explaining why the statute conforms to Boerne). Fourth, also in 2000, Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491. This statute, how-
ever, is concerned principally with federal funding directed at the prevention of domestic vio-
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B. Congress and the Drafting of Constitutional Legislation
That Congress sometimes equates Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing with the Constitution speaks more of legislators’ interest in
achieving desired political outcomes than anything else. Opponents of
legislation, when raising constitutional objections, are on firmer
footing when they suggest that the federal courts will strike down a
measure. And, as was true with Phil Gramm’s effort to undo set-
asides, proponents of initiatives likewise seek to bolster their case by
claiming that they are simply effectuating the decisions of the Su-
preme Court. Moreover, by embracing expedited review provisions
(that short-circuit fights over a measure’s constitutionality), bill sup-
porters help to secure passage of a favored measure. Finally, when re-
crafting legislation in accordance with a Supreme Court decision,
Congress often is motivated by the interests of the constituencies that
supported the legislation in the first place.
Just as talk of the Court’s status as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution may be a rhetorical device used to pursue political ends,
it is to be expected that Congress sometimes ignores the Court in or-
der to pursue a political end. For this reason, I think it especially use-
ful to examine some recent occasions in which Congress seemed, at
best, indifferent to the Court. Before turning to these examples, a few
words on why the recent spate of anti-Congress Rehnquist Court
rulings is, in part, a by-product of such legislative indifference. Spe-
cifically, just as talk of judicial supremacy encourages the Court to see
itself as supreme and, consequently, to place more and more con-
straints on Congress, legislative indifference to Court rulings creates
more and more occasions in which Congress will run afoul of those
ever-increasing constraints. And if Congress fails to challenge the
Court by asserting its independent voice in interpreting the Constitu-
lence. H.R. REP. NO. 106-891, at 24 (2000). No effort was made to revive the right-to-sue provi-
sion struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress
did not have the power, either under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to provide all victims of gender-motivated crime with a federal civil remedy).
Congress, moreover, embraced Department of Transportation efforts to modify its
regulatory scheme in response to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Not-
ing that “the Department has proposed a number of regulations intended to address the ‘narrow
tailoring’ requirements of ‘strict scrutiny,’” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-550, at 410–11 (1998), re-
printed in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 70, 82–83, Congress, in 1998, reauthorized the disadvantaged busi-
ness enterprise program that was the subject of the Adarand litigation. Transportation Equity
Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
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tion, the Court is apt to grow less and less tolerant of such congres-
sional lapses and create even more constraining doctrine.
Two recent examples of Congress giving short shrift to both the
Constitution and the Supreme Court stand out: the Communications
Decency Act (CDA)59 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).60 When enacting the CDA (introduced on the Senate floor
as an amendment to a massive telecommunications bill), Congress ig-
nored Clinton administration warnings to hold hearings on the bill’s
constitutionality.61 Rather, as Senator Patrick Leahy described: “[We]
went willy-nilly, pass[ing] legislation, and never once . . . [having] a
discussion other than an hour or so on the floor.”62 The result was a
bill that “[n]o one, not even its defenders, claims . . . was drafted ele-
gantly or even consistently.”63 A unanimous Supreme Court agreed,
noting the lack of hearings, inconsistencies in the bill’s use of the term
“indecent,” and Congress’s failure to consider less burdensome alter-
natives.64
RFRA is an even more outrageous example of Congress’s indif-
ference to how its legislation would fare before the Supreme Court.65
Here, Congress, in response to a restrictive Supreme Court interpre-
tation of Free Exercise Clause protections, attempted to justify its ac-
tions as a permissible exercise of its enforcement powers under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 But Congress ignored the
59. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133, partially in-
validated in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
60. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993), invalidated in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).
61. See John Schwartz, On-Line Obscenity Bill Gains in Senate, Panel Backs Legislation,
Critics See Threat to First Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at A1 (quoting White House
spokeswoman Ginny Terzano’s call for a “serious approach—such as hearings—to find the best
solution”).
62. Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, The State of the Technology, and
the Need for Congressional Action: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
7 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)). Perhaps for this reason, an expedited review provi-
sion was added to the CDA. See 142 CONG. REC. 2662 (1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting
that “such serious questions about the constitutionality of this legislation have been raised that a
new section was added to speed up judicial review to see if the legislation would pass constitu-
tional muster”).
63. Peter D. Kennedy, The Supreme Court and Cyberspace: Pending Challenges to the
Communications Decency Act, COMM. L., Fall 1996, at 3, 3.
64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 858.
65. For a detailed treatment of this subject (from which this paragraph draws), see gener-
ally Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645 (1998).
66. In this way, Congress could have expressed its (quite justified) disapproval of the Su-
preme Court’s religious liberty decisionmaking without demanding that the Court overrule it-
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advice of law professors who testified that it should make specific
findings of fact “that formally neutral, generally applicable laws have
historically been instruments of religious persecution, that enacting
separate religious liberty exemptions in every statute is not a work-
able means of protecting religious liberty, and that litigation about
governmental motives is not a workable means of protecting religious
liberty.”67 Instead, Congress condemned the Court for its “disas-
trous,”68 “dastardly and unprovoked,”69 and “devastating”70 “degrada-
tion,”71 if not “virtual[] eliminat[ion,]”72 of religious liberty protec-
tions. And while RFRA’s interest-group sponsors may have
welcomed such vitriol, the Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v Flo-
res,73 rebuffed Congress for seeking to statutorily overturn a Court in-
terpretation of the Constitution.74 More fundamentally, the Court ex-
pressed skepticism of Congress by embracing a standard of review
that has further curtailed Congress’s Section 5 enforcement powers.75
self. And because the Court (in a decision issued in the midst of legislative consideration of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act) had made clear that “to overrule under [political] fire . . .
would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question,” lawmakers should have
acted judiciously when seeking to chasten the Court for its restrictive reading of First Amend-
ment religious liberty protections. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). In-
stead, lawmakers acted with reckless abandon. See Devins, supra note 42, at 1196, 1197 (arguing
that Congress gave “short shrift to factfinding” when enacting RFRA).
67. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 331 (1992) (testimony of Pro-
fessor Douglas Laycock); see also id. at 390–91 (testimony of Professor Ira C. Lupu) (calling at-
tention to the need for Congress to show that RFRA is grounded in “legislative superiority in
fact-finding” and not Congress’s disapproval with the “direction and result” of Supreme Court
decisionmaking).
68. 139 CONG. REC. 9683 (1993) (statement of Rep. Nadler (D-NY)).
69. 137 CONG. REC. 17,035–36 (1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz (D-NY)).
70. 139 CONG. REC. 9684 (1993) (statement of Rep. Schumer (D-NY)).
71. Id. at 9685 (statement of Rep. Orton (D-UT)).
72. Id. at 9683 (statement of Rep. Nadler (D-NY)).
73. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
74. Id. at 535–36. While no Justice took issue with the Court’s conclusion that Congress
had overstepped its bounds, three Justices would have reconsidered the Court’s restrictive ap-
proach toward religious liberty claims. Id. at 544–66 (Souter, Breyer, O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).
75. Since its decision in Boerne, the Court has invalidated three other federal statutes as
impermissible exercises of Congress’s Section 5 enforcement powers. See Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967–68, (2001) (partially invalidating the
Americans with Disabilities Act on the ground that it conflicts with the Eleventh Amendment);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding Congress’s abrogation of states’
sovereign immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be unconstitutional); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (invalidating
the Patent Remedy Act as an unconstitutional abrogation of state immunity that cannot be justi-
fied by Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power).
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Congress, however, has not paid much mind to this tightening of
its Section 5 powers. A search of the Congressional Record reveals
that members of Congress have mentioned the precedential value of
Boerne on only nine occasions.76 Congress’s apparent disinterest in
Boerne is the rule, not the exception, when it comes to recent Court
decisions limiting congressional prerogatives. United States v. Lopez,77
the case that invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, also has re-
ceived scant attention in congressional debates. Notwithstanding the
fact that Lopez was the first case in more than sixty years to declare a
federal statute outside Congress’s Commerce Clause power (and that
it has since proven an instrumental precedent in invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act)78, members of Congress have men-
tioned the case’s precedential value only sixteen times since 1995, the
year Lopez was decided.79 Finally, the Court’s anticommandeering
cases, Printz v. United States80 and New York v. United States,81 have
not figured into congressional deliberations. The precedential value
76. See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from June
25, 1997 (the date of the Boerne decision) to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. E1235
(daily ed. July 14, 2000) (remarks of Rep. Canady (R-FL)) (defending the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act as a protection of free exercise not subject to the challenges
raised in Boerne); 146 CONG. REC. S3973 (daily ed. May 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Biden (D-
DE)) (citing Boerne as testament to the Court’s willingness to second-guess Congress’s legisla-
tive judgment and assert itself as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution). On nine
other occasions, Boerne was mentioned—six times in connection with the scheduling of hearings
and three times in connection with the inclusion of letters and memos into the Record. Boerne
also was mentioned six times in connection with efforts to revamp the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act.
77. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
78. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (concluding that the Commerce
Clause did not give Congress the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act).
79. See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from April
26, 1995 (the date of the Lopez decision) to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H7533
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson (D-AR)) (characterizing the Lopez
decision as a warning that congressional power under the Commerce Clause is subject to outer
limits); 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT)
and Sen. Kennedy (D-MA)) (noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence
Against Women Act were struck down because they regulated noneconomic activity). In 1995,
Lopez’s precedential value was mentioned ten times by members of Congress. On nine other
occasions, the case was mentioned in connection with letters and memoranda entered into the
Congressional Record. Lopez also was mentioned five times in connection with efforts to re-
vamp the laws regarding guns in schools.
80. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
81. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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of New York has been mentioned by members of Congress six times;82
the precedential value of Printz has been mentioned twice.83
While these measures are somewhat artificial, they are nonethe-
less telling. At a minimum, they suggest that Congress is not paying
much attention to the signals the Court is sending it. Correspondingly,
Congress seems more and more willing to jeopardize its legislative
work through sloppy drafting.84 On federalism-related issues, for ex-
ample, the federal laws struck down “were quite poorly or negligently
drafted.”85 In Lopez, Congress failed to engage in factfinding, make a
jurisdictional statement, or otherwise consider the constitutionality of
its handiwork.86 In the Violence Against Women Act, Congress did
assemble a “mountain of data . . . showing the effects of violence
against women on interstate commerce.”87 At the same time, by
82. See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from June
19, 1992 (the date of the New York decision) to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S3909
(daily ed. Apr. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Lott (R-MS)) (asserting that his changes to the Na-
tional Salvage Motor Vehicle Consumer Protection Act were consistent with the decision in
New York v. United States); 144 CONG. REC. S5100 (daily ed. May 19, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch (R-UT)) (arguing that decisions like New York and Printz have made the Tenth
Amendment a shield against federal imposition on the sovereign authority of the states).
83. See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from June
27, 1997 (the date of the Printz decision) to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7777 (daily
ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT) and Sen. Kennedy (D-MA)) (arguing
that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act complies with Printz because it
does not “compel the states to enact or enforce a regulatory program”). On several other occa-
sions, however, members of Congress have introduced letters, memoranda, and resolutions that
mention these cases—thirteen times for New York and three times for Printz. See Matthew D.
Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998
SUP. CT. REV. 71, 138 (discussing the paucity of references to New York and Printz).
84. See supra notes 59–75 and accompanying text (discussing how poor legislative drafting
helped doom the Communications Decency Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
other high-profile enactments).
85. Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post-Lopez World: Some
Questions and Answers, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10980, 10989 (2000). Several of the examples that
follow are drawn from Professor Gerhardt’s article.
86. See Devins, supra note 42, at 1194. The fact that the Supreme Court had not signaled
(through pre-Lopez decisionmaking) that such factfinding might be relevant to its assessment of
the statute does not excuse Congress’s sloppiness. In critical respects, Lopez responded to Con-
gress’s increasingly cavalier attitude toward the scope of its Commerce Clause powers. In par-
ticular, Congress federalized all sorts of things without engaging in factfinding or contemplating
the ways in which such federalization expanded the workload of federal judges. See infra notes
106–10 and accompanying text (discussing how federalization affected the federal judiciary).
And while a Supreme Court with different values would not have interceded, the Court’s action
in Lopez—notwithstanding the lack of prior notice—can be understood as a response to Con-
gress’s negligence.
87. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628–29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). Con-
gress assembled this data to respond to complaints that the statute had little to do with com-
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grounding the statute in both Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause, Congress disregarded the well-
settled rule that it could not use its Section 5 power to regulate pri-
vate conduct.88 And in several cases restricting Congress’s Section 5
powers, Congress’s factfinding was too limited or nonexistent.89 In
particular, Congress failed to convince the Court that it was re-
sponding to a nationwide problem involving both state and private ac-
tors.90 For these very reasons, the Court, while invalidating scores of
federal laws, has had to overturn only three of its precedents.91
Making matters worse, Congress had every reason to expect that
the Court would make it pay a price for its sloppiness. For example,
in both the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against
Women Act, Congress enacted legislation federalizing crime over
objections by both the Judicial Conference and Chief Justice
Rehnquist.92 More to the point, since most states bar gun possession
merce. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (noting objections to the statute voiced by both
the Judicial Conference and Chief Justice William Rehnquist). The majority, while not disputing
this assertion, concluded that violence against women was “noneconomic.” Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 613.
88. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619–24.
89. For example, when enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress failed
to make the types of findings needed to show that a national solution was necessary. See supra
note 67 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text (discussing RFRA); see also Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955, 965–66 (2001) (discussing congres-
sional failure to establish the historical basis of state discrimination against the disabled); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (“Congress never identified any pattern of age dis-
crimination by States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitu-
tional violation.”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (observing that Congress did not identify a “pattern of patent infringement
by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations”).
91. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
680 (rejecting the constructive waiver doctrine of Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama
Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (re-
jecting Congress’s power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment via a statute enacted under the
Commerce Clause, overturning Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that federal affirmative action pro-
grams are subject to strict scrutiny review, not intermediate scrutiny review, overturning Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
92. Rehnquist, in 1992, wrote that Congress ought to “avoid adding new federal causes of
action unless critical to meeting important national interests that cannot otherwise be satisfied
through non-judicial forums, alternative dispute resolution techniques or the state courts.” Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, Congress Is Crippling Federal Courts, Ever-Expanding Number of ‘Federal’
Crimes; Belong in State Courts Instead, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 1992, at 3B. The
Judicial Conference also expressed opposition to both the federalization of crime and the Line
Item Veto Act, arguing that it would threaten judicial independence by expanding the presi-
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in school and every state provides civil remedies for gender-related
violence,93 the Court may well have seen these attempts to expand the
scope of federal power as little more than Congress pandering to
popular sentiment.
No doubt, a Court with different values may have welcomed—as
Senator Joseph Biden put it—Congress’s federalizing “‘everything
that walks, talks, and moves.’”94 The Rehnquist Court, however, is not
that Court. Rather than look the other way, it seized upon Congress’s
sloppiness.95 Put another way, Congress had significant control over
its fate. Had Congress acted more cautiously, the Rehnquist Court
may have deferred the return of the “Constitution in Exile.”96
C. Congress and the Management of the Federal Judiciary
Congress has jeopardized its relationship with the Supreme
Court further through its handling of several matters affecting the
day-to-day lives of federal judges, including judicial salaries, the pace
of judicial confirmations, and a range of issues affecting federal
judges’ workloads. And while some of these matters have no direct
relationship to Court decisionmaking on federalism-related issues, it
is nevertheless true that the attitudes of federal judges, including Su-
dent’s power over judicial salaries. See id. (discussing federalization of crime); Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Judges Back on Political Hot Seat, Controversial Ruling Sparks Criticism, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 3, 1996, at 1 (discussing line-item veto legislation). After Congress (responding to
Judicial Conference objections) revamped the Violence Against Women Act, the Judicial Con-
ference took no position on the legislation. For an account of this episode, see Judith Resnik,
The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women
Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 270–274 (2000).
93. See Steve France, Laying the Groundwork, 86 A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (2000) (characterizing
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Violence
Against Women Act as “busybody legislation”).
94. Dan Freedman, FBI Criticizes Trend Towards “Federalizing,” Agents Don’t Want to Be
Street Cops, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1993, at A2 (quoting Sen. Biden (D-DE)).
95. Professor Keith Whittington, in his response to Professor Schroeder’s paper, puts it this
way: “The federalism offensive can best be understood as a product of the Court’s taking advan-
tage of a relatively favorable political environment to advance a constitutional agenda of par-
ticular concern to some individuals within the Court’s conservative majority.” Keith E. Whit-
tington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J.
477, 479 (2001).
96. The fact that the Rehnquist Court often divides 5-4 on federalism-related issues bol-
sters this claim. Specifically, if any member of the Rehnquist Court majority had been influ-
enced by Congress’s cavalier approach to federalism-related issues, the Court would have
lacked the majority it needed to push through its federalism counterrevolution. See infra note
128 (collecting sources that suggest that Congress still retains the power to pursue initiatives
that the Rehnquist Court has invalidated on federalism-related grounds).
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preme Court Justices, toward Congress are affected by Congress’s
management of issues related to the judiciary. In other words, a Court
that has doubts about Congress’s trustworthiness will find it easier to
constrain Congress than will a Court that has a high regard for Con-
gress.97
Over the past five years, Chief Justice Rehnquist has used his
year-end report on the federal judiciary to encourage Congress to live
up to its responsibility “to enable the judges to do a better job of ad-
ministering justice.”98 Consider, for example, judicial salaries. In 1996,
Rehnquist complained that Congress’s failure to pay judges a com-
petitive salary “cannot be overstated in terms of its effects on the mo-
rale and quality of the federal judiciary.”99 Four years later, in sup-
porting the repeal of a congressional ban on honoraria, Rehnquist
pointed to the fact that “‘a first-year associate in a law firm could
make as much in salary as a federal judge,’” and again argued that
Congress was undermining “‘the ability of the judiciary to retain and
recruit the most capable lawyers.’”100 Making matters worse, Con-
gress—from 1997 to 1999—refused to make cost-of-living adjustments
to judicial salaries.101 And while Congress’s action may be more a re-
sult of the politics surrounding congressional pay than anything else,
lawmaker insensitivity to judicial salaries nevertheless harmed Con-
gress-Court relations.102
Far more damaging to Congress-Court relations, however, is a
constellation of interconnected issues involving both the workload of
federal judges and the types of cases that federal judges hear. First,
the total number of cases filed in the federal courts of appeals has in-
97. In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court Justices would
knowingly retaliate against Congress for its poor management of judiciary-related issues. My
point, instead, is that there is a correlation between attitudes toward government and Supreme
Court decisionmaking. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 346–51 (discussing the impact of public
distrust of government on the growing opposition to federalization).
98. William H. Rehnquist, 1996 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.
uscourts.gov/cj96.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
99. Id.
100. Judges and Honoraria, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2000, at A18.
101. See Underpaid Federal Judges, CHI. TRIB., July 26, 1999, at 10 (noting that a lawsuit by
federal judges to receive cost-of-living adjustments may have been mooted by a new appropria-
tions bill that permitted such raises).
102. Judicial salary increases typically are tied to congressional pay. In 1997, however, Con-
gress forgot to include a salary increase for federal judges. Pay Freeze Raises Tension Between
Congress, Federal Judges, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 21, 1997, at 4A.
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creased more than seventy percent over the past two decades.103 Dur-
ing the same period, federal district courts saw the total number of
criminal cases increase by fifty percent, with drug cases tripling.104 As
a result, “[c]ivil cases are often placed on the back burner, in some ju-
risdictions, as the judges try to cope with the flood of drug and gun
cases.”105
Second, Congress has contributed to this explosion of federal
litigation by increasingly federalizing matters (especially crime).106
More than “40 percent of federal criminal provisions enacted since
the Civil War have been enacted since 1970.”107 Among other things,
Congress has criminalized many things that the states already outlaw,
including drug crimes, carjacking, failure to pay child support, embez-
zlement from an insurance company, drive-by shootings, and posses-
sion of a handgun near a school.108 For their part, the federal courts
have resisted this increasing federalization. In 1995 and again in 1998,
the Judicial Conference lobbied Congress to “commit itself to con-
serving the federal courts as a distinctive forum of limited jurisdiction
in our system of federalism.”109 Chief Justice Rehnquist, moreover,
used his bully pulpit to warn Congress of the costs of federalization—
clogging the courts’ dockets, overworking federal judges, changing
103. Between 1981 and 1991, there was a sixty percent increase. L. RALPH MECHAM,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 81 tbl.1
(1992). With Congress’s continuing commitment to federalization, the number of filings is still
increasing. By 1996, filings in the federal courts of appeals had risen to an all-time high of
52,000. See Rehnquist, supra note 98. By 2000, filings increased another four percent to 54,697.
William H. Rehnquist, 2000 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.
gov/ttb/jan01ttb (last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
104. MECHAM, supra note 103, at 90 tbl.8. Since that time, criminal filings have continued to
rise. From 1994 to 2000, criminal filings rose every year. See Rehnquist, supra note 103. In 1998,
federal courts saw a double-digit increase in criminal filings. William H. Rehnquist, 1998 Year-
End Report of the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan99ttb/january1999.html
(last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
105. Letter from J. Clifford Wallace, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, to William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court; Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney
General; Joseph Biden, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee; Jack Brooks, Chair, House Judici-
ary Committee (Mar. 29, 1993), reprinted in William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical
Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 739 (1995).
106. See generally William P. Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Proc-
ess Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 142–47 (1998) (describing this phenomenon
and offering an explanation of why Congress federalizes so many areas of legal concern).
107. John J. Mountjoy, The Federalization of Criminal Laws, SPECTRUM, Summer 1999, at
1, 1.
108. This list is taken from Edwin Meese III, Big Brother on the Beat: The Expanding Feder-
alization of Crime, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (1997).
109. Rehnquist, supra note 104.
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the character of the types of cases that federal judges adjudicate, and,
perhaps most significantly, damaging “our system of federalism.”110
Third, Congress (as far as federal judges are concerned) added
insult to injury both by failing to create additional judgeships to meet
a litigation explosion that is largely its making and by holding up judi-
cial and Sentencing Commission nominations. All of these matters
have figured prominently in Rehnquist’s year-end reports on the fed-
eral judiciary. In January 1998, Rehnquist depicted the Senate’s fail-
ure to confirm judicial nominees as threatening to “‘erod[e] the qual-
ity of justice.’”111 Again in January 1999, he spoke of the need—with
the increasing federalization of crime—to have “a fully functioning
Sentencing Commission” and described the “political impasse” be-
tween the President and Congress as “stunning.”112 Finally, in January
1998 and January 2000, he spoke of the need for Congress to “elimi-
nate the disparity between resources and workload in the Federal ju-
diciary by . . . [expanding] . . . the number of judges.”113
Court-Congress relations, for the reasons detailed above, have
been at a low ebb during the Rehnquist years.114 And while judges’
110. Id.; see also id. (calling for a reexamination of diversity jurisdiction, claiming that “there
is no good reason to keep [these lawsuits] in federal court”); William H. Rehnquist, 1999 Year-
End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan00ttb/jan2000.html (last
visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (calling attention to the increasing
federalization of crime and arguing for the elimination of “unwarranted federalization” to “help
control growth in federal courts and preserve them as courts of limited jurisdiction”); supra note
92 and accompanying text (noting Rehnquist’s objection to the Violence Against Women Act).
111. John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Imperils Judicial System, Rehnquist Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1998, at A1 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist). At that time, one in ten judgeships had
been vacant with several of the vacancies in existence for eighteen or more months. Id.
112. Rehnquist, supra note 104. When Rehnquist issued this statement, there were no com-
missioners on the Sentencing Commission and no nominations pending. Id. It is also noteworthy
that the Sentencing Commission, by severely limiting judicial discretion at sentencing, removed
significant discretionary authority from the courts and vested that power in Congress. James B.
Burns et al., We Make the Better Targets (But the Guidelines Shifted Power from the Judiciary to
Congress, Not from the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1317, 1317–21 (1997).
113. William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, excerpted in Ju-
diciary Report: Congress is Prodded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at A14; see also Rehnquist, supra
note 103 (commending Congress for creating ten new district judgeships and urging legislators
to continue this trend).
114. Federal judges, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, also have been critical of the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. By regulating the ways district
courts develop procedures for managing their dockets, the Judicial Conference saw the Act as
both “subjecting court rules to political whimsy” and violating “the separation of powers doc-
trine by having the legislature manage the workings of the courts.” Stephen Labaton, Business
and the Law, Biden’s Challenge to Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1990, at D2; see also
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claims about what is in the best interest of the judicial branch may
“obscure the judges’ self-interested personal motivations for pre-
serving and enhancing their own positions in the system,”115 it is nev-
ertheless true that the Supreme Court has ample reason to point the
finger at Congress for changing (for the worse) the job of being a fed-
eral court judge. It is hardly surprising that this change has occurred
during the same period that the Court increasingly has struck down
acts of Congress. The Court’s view of Congress is shaped, in part, by
Congress’s interest in addressing matters that the judiciary deems es-
sential to the administration of justice.116
CONCLUSION: WAKE ME UP WHEN THE REVOLUTION IS OVER
In determining what deference is owed to Congress, the Justices
cannot help but think about how seriously Congress takes both the
Constitution and the Court.117 For this reason, Congress is partially to
blame for the recent wave of Court decisions invalidating federal
laws. Poor drafting, including inattention to the signals being sent to
Congress by the Supreme Court, has figured prominently in this raft
of decisions. Likewise, Congress’s apparent disinterest in preserving
its power as a coequal interpreter of the Constitution encourages the
Court to see itself as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional truth. And
finally, Congress’s “what-me-worry” attitude toward judicial branch
needs has exacerbated strains between the Court and Congress.
Rehnquist, supra note 92, at 3B (criticizing the Act for “lessening the traditional freedom of the
district judge”).
115. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT
ADMINISTRATION 133 (1995); see also Neil A. Lewis, Hatch Defends Senate Action on Judge-
ships, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1998, at A1 (suggesting that judges were “partly to blame for their
heavy caseloads”). See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Rede-
fining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1224–29 (1996) (dis-
cussing possible methods of facilitating positive interaction between Congress and the courts).
116. Of course, the Justices’ principal concern is the statute the constitutionality of which is
being challenged. Nevertheless, judicial attitudes toward Congress are likely to be a contributing
factor in defining the Court’s views on Congress’s trustworthiness and, with it, the Court’s will-
ingness to take a hard look at Congress’s handiwork. See supra note 97 and accompanying text
(noting the correlation between congressional actions and Supreme Court decisionmaking).
117. Professor Schroeder, therefore, is correct in calling attention to how “motivated rea-
soning” affects Court decisionmaking. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 352–56 (reasoning that
general distrust of the federal government provides Justices with a reason to prefer limiting fed-
eral power). Just as the Justices (perhaps subconsciously) factor attitudes toward Congress’s
trustworthiness into their decisionmaking, the Justices also are apt to take into account Con-
gress’s views about its role in constitutional interpretation.
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That Congress is partially to blame for bringing back the “Con-
stitution in Exile” cannot be denied. The Rehnquist Court, already
predisposed to pay close attention to issues involving the scope of
Congress’s power, has seized upon Congress’s failure to take seriously
its role as coequal interpreter of the Constitution. But why is Con-
gress increasingly cavalier in its handling of constitutional questions?
To begin with, lawmakers have little incentive to sacrifice their indi-
vidual interests for something as abstract as Congress’s institutional
interest in asserting its voice as coequal interpreter of the Constitu-
tion.118 In particular, members of Congress need to be reelected to ad-
vance their (and their constituents’) interests. With little to gain by
raising constitutional objections to a politically popular bill, lawmak-
ers would rather vote for the measure and leave it to the courts to sort
out the bill’s constitutionality.119 Nothing, of course, is new about this
practice; nevertheless, several recent developments have conspired to
make Congress especially insensitive to the constitutional fate of its
enactments.
First, Congress not only increasingly delegates its core powers to
others, but also, in explaining why, it often points the finger at itself
for the failings of government. Witness, for example, the 1994 Con-
tract with America. Premised on the belief that Congress is irrespon-
sible and unworthy of trust, the Contract with America ostensibly
sought to limit congressional power in several ways, including by im-
posing term limits, prohibiting unfunded mandates, and creating the
line-item veto. On the line-item veto, for example, Senator Dan Coats
and others argued: Congress “cannot discipline itself. . . . [It] is selfish
and greedy and . . . cannot put the national interest ahead of parochial
interests or special interests.”120 And while the Contract with America
118. Lawmakers, in other words, are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, but each has a strong incen-
tive to free ride in favor of the local constituency.” Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The
Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 144 (1999).
119. This, in part, explains both the use of expedited review provisions, see supra notes 31–
44 and accompanying text, and the paucity of lawmaker references to recent Supreme Court de-
cisions striking down acts of Congress, see supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. For a
competing perspective, see Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1288 (2001) (“[S]ome legislators sometimes treat con-
stitutional argument as one indicator of the ‘public interest’ or ‘good public policy,’ which in
turn has some weight as against legislators’ other interests, goals, and aims.”).
120. Line-Item Veto: Joint Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform and
Oversight and the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 22 (1995) (quoting Sen.
Coats (R-IN)). Moreover, Senator Gordon Humphrey observed: “Congress has flunked the
test. We do not deserve the status quo. We have flunked. We are dunces, we are truants, we are
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has fizzled, Congress remains ready, willing, and eager to cede core
powers—especially budgetary and war powers.121 This pattern is likely
to continue, for the declining public trust in government creates in-
centives for lawmakers to distance themselves from Congress by en-
gaging in mutual self-flagellation.122
Second, Congress has little incentive to take recent Supreme
Court decisions into account and thereby slow down the pace of fed-
eralization because interest groups increasingly prefer national legis-
lation to state and local measures.123 As compared to lobbying fifty
state legislatures, for example, there is a far lower transaction cost as-
sociated with national legislation.124 More significantly, the political
culture has become increasingly nationalized. Changes both in media
coverage and advertising have made all politics national—so that
guns in schools, carjacking, and the like are considered national, not
local, problems.125
Third (and relatedly), Congress is not particularly disappointed
with Court decisionmaking. Unlike during Court-curbing periods,
many members of Congress now are somewhat sympathetic to, say,
juvenile delinquents with the budget.” 135 CONG. REC. 28,091 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hum-
phrey (R-NH)). Needless to say, term limits take aim at Congress in an even more direct way.
Representative Henry Hyde noted: “The popularity of term limits is a measure of the low es-
teem our citizens have for politics and politicians. . . . [And given the way we] attack each other
and the way we demean this institution in every campaign, it is no wonder we are held in con-
tempt.” 143 CONG. REC. H470 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde (R-IL)).
121. For a detailing of the steady and continuing decline of Congress’s war and spending
powers, see generally FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION, supra note 29.
122. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 347 (providing a graph gauging the rise and fall of pub-
lic trust in government from 1958–1998).
123. See generally Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 364–78
(1997) (describing the centripetal forces that account for the tendency toward centralization of
regulatory authority); Marshall, supra note 106, at 141–47 (discussing Congress’s reaction to the
Supreme Court’s revived concern for federalism).
124. See Friedman, supra note 123, at 373–75 (explaining the economic benefits for interest
groups in seeking federal, rather than state, regulation); see also Jonathan Macey, Federal Def-
erence to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice
Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 272–73 (1990) (calling attention to the fact that
it is harder for regulated parties to avoid national, as compared to local, regulation).
125. See Marshall, supra note 106, at 151–52 (reasoning that media coverage of distant
crimes creates the impression that crime requires a national solution). Correspondingly, there is
little cost to Congress if the Supreme Court invalidates its statutes. In particular, by enacting the
statute, lawmakers accomplish their principal objective, that is, signaling to relevant constituents
that they are working on the problem. See infra notes 130–33 and accompanying text (discussing
the rise of symbolic legislation). Moreover, Congress, if need be, can respond to the Supreme
Court by enacting a narrower version of the bill. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing examples).
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Court efforts to protect state prerogatives.126 For this very reason,
Representative Lee Hamilton, after observing that lawmakers
seemed “detached from the actual work of the federal judiciary, par-
ticularly as it relates to the exercise of congressional power,” specu-
lated that Congress “has become more conservative, and many mem-
bers are comfortable with most of the Court’s rulings.”127 Moreover,
Supreme Court decisions have not prevented Congress from re-
sponding to constituent demands. Congress has the tools to respond
to many of these decisions. For example, it can recraft a bill by
grounding it in a different source of federal power or it can narrow its
scope.128 Finally, because much of what is struck down is redundant of
state enactments, Congress will feel relatively little constituent pres-
sure to respond to the Court.129
Fourth, Congress increasingly is concerned with “message poli-
tics,” that is, using the legislative process to make a symbolic state-
ment to voters and other constituents.130 Rather than look to commit-
126. When Court decisionmaking has upset the constituencies of individual members of
Congress (for example, in the case of court-ordered busing or the rejection of early New Deal
legislation), Congress had a reason to defend its institutional prerogatives and pressure the
Court to follow Congress’s understanding of the Constitution. When Congress is not at war with
the Court, however, the individual interests of its members diverge from the institutional inter-
est of defending Congress’s constitutional power as coequal interpreter of the Constitution. See
supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (detailing why Congress—when it comes to inter-
preting the Constitution—has little incentive to fight for its institutional prerogatives).
127. 144 CONG. REC. E48 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hamilton (D-IN)).
128. See Gerhardt, supra note 85, at 10988–90 (explaining how Congress can make better
use of its treaty and spending powers); see also T.R. Goldman, Lawmakers Take Steps to Re-
spond After Legislation Is Found Unconstitutional, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 8 (arguing
that Congress can enact more comprehensive regulatory schemes than those struck down by the
Court); Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? 1–5 (Oct.
28, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for “New Voices on the New Federalism,” Villa-
nova Law School, Oct. 28, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (same); supra note 58 and
accompanying text (discussing examples of congressional responses); infra note 138 and accom-
panying text (discussing how the Court benefits from such an incremental strategy).
129. See infra notes 130–133 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress seems espe-
cially interested in approving symbolic legislation). Furthermore, were the Supreme Court to
shut the door on federal initiatives, constituents still could seek relief from state lawmakers.
Following the Supreme Court’s rejection of Congress’s efforts to extend the Americans with
Disabilities Act to state agencies, for example, several states passed legislation waiving their
immunity to federal ADA lawsuits. See Helen Irvin, Several States Respond to Garrett Decision,
Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 70 U.S.L.W. 2003 (2001) (discussing bills re-
cently introduced in Minnesota, Rhode Island, California, and New York).
130. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Message Politics: Party Campaigning and Legislative
Strategy in Congress (Aug. 2000) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Po-
litical Science Association) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (ar-
DEVINS.DOC 12/03/01 9:29 AM
462 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:435
tee leadership to define Congress’s agenda, Republicans and Demo-
crats alike see the lawmaking process as expressive, a way for the
members of each party to coalesce behind their party's policy
agenda.131 Likewise, by focusing its efforts on the message it is send-
ing, Congress places less emphasis on what happens to legislation af-
ter it is enacted. Instead of negotiating with the president over the
specifics of legislation (so as to stave off a possible veto), “Congress
can, and routinely does, pass laws deliberately designed to provoke a
presidential veto.”132 Likewise, a Court decision striking down legisla-
tion is not especially problematic. Indeed, the Court’s decision creates
an occasion for Congress to revisit the issue and, in this way, facili-
tates lawmaker efforts to, once again, send a symbolic message to
voters and other constituents.133
Congress has yet to see the return of the “Constitution in Exile”
as especially problematic. The changing face of lawmaking places less
emphasis on securing presidential and judicial approval of legislation
and more emphasis on doing what is politically popular (federalizing
crime, for example). So long as the Court is not standing in the way of
urgent constituent demands, there is little reason for Congress to
break out of this pattern. In other words, the constitutional counter-
revolution that so preoccupies legal academics appears little more
than a blip on Congress’s radar screen.
For the Rehnquist Court, however, Congress’s apparent indiffer-
ence to its rulings is anything but insignificant. The Court waited until
the 1994 elections before launching its counterrevolution, and even
then the Court moved gingerly—striking down relatively few laws
and striking them down on somewhat ambiguous grounds.134 Today,
guing that “message politics” shapes the strategic decisions of legislators at all stages of the
lawmaking process).
131. Id. at 3.
132. See John B. Gilmour, Institutional and Individual Influences on the President’s Veto, J.
POL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
133. And with voters expecting less and less of Congress, it may be that this type of signal
satisfies lawmakers’ needs to get something done (that they can report back to their constitu-
ents). See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 336–38 (detailing voters’ lower expectations for congres-
sional performance).
134. Most notably, following the Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), there was reason to think that the Court’s sole complaint with the guns-near-schools
laws was the paucity of legislative factfinding. See Philip Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congres-
sional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 695, 703 (1996) (contrasting the Fifth Circuit’s focus on the absence of findings with the
Supreme Court’s concession that their absence simply negated one source of support); see also
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however, the Court seems more aggressive, and with good reason.
Congress, if anything, is encouraging the Court through both indiffer-
ence and ill-considered legislation. Moreover, there is little reason to
fear a populist backlash like the one launched against Lochner-era
judicial decisionmaking.135 The Court remains politically popular136
and somewhat middle-of-the-road on divisive social policy issues such
as late-term abortions and school prayer.137 Also, when the Court
strikes down a law, it typically leaves Congress room to revisit the is-
sue.138
Of course, it is not impossible that the Court’s increased willing-
ness to invalidate Congress’s statutes will become a politically salient
issue—one that spurs Congress into action.139 As the New Deal
Whittington, supra note 95, at 479 (arguing that the “Court has moved carefully but steadily to
reestablish some federalism-based constraints on the national government”).
135. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that popular opinion, in part, ani-
mated the 1937 revolution). “Lochner-era” refers, of course, to the years following the Court’s
decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), invalidating a New York labor law as
violative of an employee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of contract.
136. In his 1999 year-end report, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist approvingly cited a
February 1999 Gallup Poll showing that “80 percent of Americans surveyed stated that they had
a ‘great deal’ or ‘fair’ amount of trust in the judicial branch of government, far exceeding figures
for the other branches.” Rehnquist, supra note 110. For the Supreme Court, 81 percent of
Americans, in a June 2001 Gallup Poll, said they have “some,” “quite a lot,” or a “great deal” of
confidence in the Supreme Court. Confidence in Institutions, Gallup.com, at http://www.gallup.
com/poll/indicators/indconfidence.asp#RelatedAnalyses (June 8–10, 2001) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). In other words, the Supreme Court does not appear to have suffered much
harm for its participation in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See also Wendy W. Simmons,
Election Controversy Apparently Drove Partisan Wedge into Attitudes Towards Supreme Court,
Gallup.com, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010116.asp (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (noting that, in its immediate aftermath, Bush v. Gore affected Democratic
and Republican attitudes toward the Court).
137. For assessments of the 2001 Term (all of which suggest that the Court, rather than be-
ing hard-line, was difficult to pigeonhole), see Alan M. Dershowitz, Curious Fallout from Bush
v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A15; Richard W. Garnett, Disrobed! Actually, They Think
for Themselves, WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at B2; Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A1. On the ques-
tion of whether the Lochner-era Court preserved political capital by strategically packaging its
decisions, see Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-
Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1139 (1987) (arguing that the Court was hugely suc-
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decisions”).
138. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings
and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 757, 776–79 (1996) (employing positive political theory to argue that, after declaring a
statute unconstitutional, the Court encourages an equilibrium among the branches by leaving
the door open for Congress to revisit its handiwork).
139. Furthermore, the Court itself is an issue—but not because of its anti-Congress deci-
sionmaking. Concerned with abortion, civil rights, and civil liberties, the Senate Judiciary Com-
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Court’s exiling of the Lochner-era decisionmaking suggests, the Jus-
tices can make the Court a political issue by frustrating a broad popu-
list mandate.140 For example, if the face of Congress changes, it is pos-
sible that the Court may find itself out-of-step with the policy
preferences of lawmakers. Indeed, because Democrats now control
the confirmation of federal court appointees, lawmakers—interested
in limiting the George W. Bush administration’s power to shape fed-
eral court decisionmaking—may try to make the Court an issue. Also,
the Justices’ growing confidence in their anti-Congress agenda (espe-
cially if fueled by Bush appointees willing to push the envelope even
further) may result in rulings that prod Congress into action.141 Until
that time, however, Congress is likely to sit back and wait out the
purported return of the “Constitution in Exile.” Its motto (if it had
the energy to have one): “Wake Me Up When the Revolution is
Over.”
mittee is now engaged in a battle over what role, if any, ideology should play in the selection
and confirmation of judges. See Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2001, at A19 (arguing that senators should use ideology when examining judicial nominees);
Byron York, More Hearings, More Delays, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, at http://www.
nationalreview.com/york/york062601.shtml (June 26, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(same); Meet the Press: Senators Charles Schumer and Jeff Sessions Discuss Whether Personal
Ideology Should Matter When Confirming Federal Judiciary Nominees (NBC television broad-
cast, July 1, 2001) (transcript on file with the Duke Law Journal) (same).
140. See Caldeira, supra note 137, at 1143–44 (discussing the relationship between media
coverage of the Supreme Court and support for Court-packing); Richard Funston, The Supreme
Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 802 (1975) (noting the decline and sub-
sequent rise in Court prestige after the Civil War and its impact on judicial ability to direct pub-
lic policy).
141. Following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
and on the Pentagon, it is possible that the Justices will slow down their efforts to limit Con-
gress. In particular, social and political forces may dictate that the Court pay greater respect to
the federal government. Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at 4. With that said, there is little reason to think that the Court will dis-
avow its recent decisions limiting Congress’s power. It seems more likely that the Court will
steer away from these disputes (at least in the near future) by making use of certiorari denials
and other delaying strategies. Also, on questions that have no direct relationship to national se-
curity, it is possible—albeit less likely now than before—that the Court will continue to limit
Congress’s power.
